Abstract. We study values for cooperative TU-games which are convex combinations of the Shapley value and the solidarity value, introduced in our recent paper [1] . First, we axiomatize the convex combination of the two values in the case when the coefficients are given exogenously. Next, we give an axiomatic description of the whole family of such values.
1. Introduction. Let N be a finite set of n players, called the grand coalition. For any coalition T ⊆ N , the small letter t will generically denote the cardinality of T . To simplify the notation one-member coalitions, for example {i}, will sometimes be denoted by i.
Let Γ denote the linear space of all n-person transferable utility (TU) games. A value on Γ is thought of as a vector-valued mapping, say ϕ : Γ → R n , which uniquely determines, for each v ∈ Γ , a distribution of the wealth available to the players through their participation in the game v.
The famous Shapley value Φ Sh on Γ is given by the formula
In our recent paper [1] , we introduced another value for TU-games, called the solidarity value. Let T be a non-empty coalition and let v ∈ Γ . The quantity
is the average marginal contribution of a member of the coalition T . The solidarity value Φ Sol on Γ is defined by
To illustrate the difference between these two values, we give a simple example.
Example. Let N ={1, 2}. Assume that v(N ) = 3, v(1) = 1, and v(2) = 0. The Shapley value for this game is Φ Sh (v) = (2, 1) while the solidarity value for v is Φ Sol (v) = (1.75, 1.25) . If the solidarity value is accepted by the players as a solution for this game then one can say that player 1 seems to be quite generous for player 2, because his or her "bargaining position" in this game is much stronger than that of player 2. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the ratio of the marginal contributions to the grand coalition of players 1 and 2 equals (v(N ) − v(2))/(v(N ) − v(1)) = 1.5 and is much closer to Φ
This example shows that the solidarity value can be accepted by the players as a solution of the game if there are some friendly relations between them which are not reflected by the characteristic function itself. The solidarity value does not seem to be a very good solution concept for studying pure economic models. However, when we think of some real social or political situations (or conflicts) sometimes we may have an impression that (at least in some subcoalitions) people would be willing to accept the solidarity value.
The Shapley value Φ Sh does not benefit null players in any game v. (By definition, i ∈ N is a null player if v(S∪i) = v(S) for any coalition S ⊂ N \i.) According to Φ Sh every null player in v gets nothing in this game. Thus, the Shapley value represents a rather severe (from social point of view) solution concept. On the other hand, the solidarity value Φ Sol represents a pretty strong social approach. Namely, a null player in v can be rewarded by Φ Sol with a positive payoff, at least in some games. Therefore, to diminish the "severity" of Φ Sh as well as the strong social properties of Φ Sol , it seems reasonable to consider compromise values between the Shapley value and the solidarity value. In this paper, we study such values in the form of convex combinations of these two values. An example is the average value given by
2. Average values. Let ϕ be a value on Γ . We adopt the following standard axioms:
We remind that π is an automorphism of the game v if v(π(S)) = v(S) for each coalition S ⊂ N .
The next postulate was introduced in [1] .
If every coalition T including player i has the average marginal contribution A v (T ) = 0, then according to A4 player i gets nothing from the game v. As shown in [1] , Axioms A1-A4 uniquely determine the solidarity value.
We now introduce a new definition and an axiom which enables us to derive the average values mentioned above. Definition 2.1. A player i ∈ N has a reverse contributions property in a game v ∈ Γ if for each coalition S including player i,
Axiom A5 (Reverse contributions). If i ∈ N has the reverse contributions property in a game v ∈ Γ , then ϕ i (v) = 0.
In other words, if the marginal contribution of player i to any coalition S is the negative of the average contribution of the members of S, then such a player gets nothing from the game. We have the following result.
Theorem 2.1. There exists a unique value ϕ on Γ satisfying Axioms A1-A3 and A5 and it is of the form
This result is a special case of a more general theorem which we will prove in Section 3.
3. A generalization. In this section, we present a natural generalization of Axiom 5, involving some non-negative parameter α.
Definition 3.1. Let α ≥ 0 be fixed. Player i is said to have the α-reverse contributions property in a game v ∈ Γ if for each coalition S including player i,
Now we are ready to propose the next axiom. According to the above definition, player i has the α-reverse contributions property when his marginal contribution to any coalition S is the negative of the average contribution of the members of S, up to the coefficient α. Therefore, it is very natural to write Axiom A5 in a more general form as follows.
Axiom A6 (α-reverse contributions). If i ∈ N has the α-reverse contributions property in a game v ∈ Γ , then ϕ i (v) = 0.
We can now state a generalization of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.1. Let α ≥ 0. There exists a unique value Φ λ on Γ satisfying Axioms A1-A3 and A6 and it is of the form
Throughout the rest of this section, let α ≥ 0 be fixed arbitrarily. To prove Theorem 3.1, we introduce a special basis for the linear space Γ . Lemma 3.2. Let T be any non-empty coalition such that T = N , and let
and , moreover , every player i ∈ N \T has the α-reverse contributions property in the game w T .
P r o o f. Assume first that d ≥ 2, where d is the cardinality of D. Using (3.3), we get
and if T = N , then ϕ i (cw T ) = c/n for each i ∈ N .
P r o o f. Fix any non-empty coalition T = N . If c = 0, then the lemma follows immediately from Axioms A1 and A2. Assume that c = 0. From Lemma 2.2, we easily conclude that every player i ∈ N \T has the α-reverse contributions property in the game cw T . By Axiom A6, ϕ i (cw T ) = 0 for all i ∈ N \T , and the remaining part of (3.5) follows now from (3.3) and the efficiency and symmetry axioms. If T = N , the proof is trivial.
From A2 and Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3, we deduce the following simple fact.
Lemma 3.4. Any value satisfying axioms A1-A3 and A6 is a linear mapping from Γ into R n .
P r o o f o f T h e o r e m 3.1. First, we show the existence of a value satisfying our Axioms A1-A3 and A6. Clearly, Φ λ given by (3.2) satisfies Axioms A2-A3. Φ λ also satisfies A1 since both the Shapley and the solidarity values are efficient [1] , [2] . To prove that Φ λ also satisfies A6 with α = (1 − λ)/λ ≥ 0, note that
for any v ∈ Γ , i ∈ N . Thus, if player i has the α-reverse contributions property in a game v, then it follows from (3.6) that Φ λ i (v) = 0, that is, Φ λ satisfies our assumption A6. To prove the uniqueness, consider a value ϕ on Γ which satisfies A1-A3 and A6. By Lemma 3.4, ϕ is a linear mapping. Clearly, the value Φ λ is also linear. Applying Lemma 3.3 to both values ϕ and Φ λ , we conclude that ϕ(w T ) = Φ λ (w T ), for each base game w T defined by (3.3). Thus,
4. Axiomatization of the class of values {Φ λ : λ ∈ (0, 1]}. In this section we do not assume that λ (or equivalently α) is exogenously given and describe axiomatically the class of all possible values of the form given in Theorem 3.1. We first fix some notation and state an auxiliary lemma.
For i ∈ N , let Γ 0 (i) be the linear space of all games v ∈ Γ in which i is a null player, and let Γ 1 (i) be the linear space of all games v ∈ Γ in which i is an A-null player. Further, we put Γ (i) := {v ∈ Γ : v(i) = 0}.
Lemma 4.1. For each i ∈ N , Γ (i) is the direct sum of the linear spaces Γ 0 (i) and Γ 1 (i), that is, One can easily check that B 0 (i) is a set of linearly independent games. Similarly, by Lemma 3.1, all games in B 1 (i) are linearly independent. On the other hand, we can directly verify that B 0 (i) ⊂ Γ 0 (i), and from Lemma 3.2, it follows that B 1 (i) ⊂ Γ 1 (i). The cardinality of B 0 (i), and also of B 1 (i), is equal to 2 n−1 − 1. Thus, Γ 0 (i) and Γ 1 (i) are at least (2 n−1 − 1)-dimensional linear spaces and the lemma follows.
In order to axiomatize the above mentioned class of values, we now give our new axioms. It is natural to expect that the "extreme points" Φ Sh and Φ Sol in the set of values of our interest will play an important role in our approach.
Axiom A7 (Shapley value proportionality). Suppose that i ∈ N is an A-null player in two games v and w. Then
The next axiom is simply symmetric to the previous one.
Axiom A8 (Solidarity value proportionality). Suppose that i ∈ N is a null player in two games v and w. Then
Axiom A9 (Rationality). If for some i ∈ N , v ∈ Γ and for each coalition S including player i, we have
The conclusion of Axiom A7 can be written in the following more readable way:
provided that we know that both Φ i (w) and Φ Sh i (w) are different from zero. A similar remark concerns Axiom A8.
Here is our second main result in this paper.
Theorem 4.1. A value Φ on Γ satisfies Axioms A1-A3 and A7-A9 if and only if there exists some α ≥ 0 such that Φ = Φ λ described in Theorem 3.1 with λ = 1/(1 + α). P r o o f. The implication (⇐) is obvious. The proof of (⇒) consists of three steps.
S t e p 1. We first prove that for every i ∈ N there exists a real number λ i such that (4.5) Consider now the game u defined as follows: u(∅) = 0 and u(S) = 1 for all S = ∅. Of course, u ∈ Γ (i). Taking into account the fact that Γ and Γ (i) are (2 n − 1)-and (2 n − 2)-dimensional linear spaces, respectively, we conclude that any game v in Γ can be represented as a sum v = v + cu with some v ∈ Γ (i) and a scalar c. Using the additivity, efficiency and symmetry axioms, we get for any v ∈ Γ ,
On the other hand, we have
Thus (4.5) holds for any game v ∈ Γ .
S t e p 2. Let n ≥ 2. We now prove that λ i in (4.5) is independent of i ∈ N . Note that the efficiency axiom implies that
which, by the efficiency of Φ Sol , is equivalent to
This, in turn, because of the efficiency of Φ Sh and Φ Sol , gives
where (4.12)
Define the games v k (k = 2, . . . , n) in the following way: If n = 1, the proof of (⇒) is trivial.
